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Writing in 1849 a keen-eyed observer, Gustav von Usedom came to the 
conclusion that “Metternich was a principle”, “a banner which one part 
of the century followed while another took a stand against it”.1 Peter Vi-
ereck, one of the most influential exponents of the “conservative renais-
sance” in the United States after the World War II looked upon Metternich 
as the “principle” of true conservatism. He held that a political philosophy 
in the abstract is incomplete, its content can be grasped better if we con-
nect it to a historical figure who tried to realize it. In his view it was 
Klemens von Metternich, the powerful chancellor and foreign minister of 
the Hapsburg Empire in the first half of the nineteenth century who is “an 
object lesson not only of short-run conservative action but of an enduring 
conservative philosophy”. To put it tersely, Viereck was of the view that 
Metternich had become “conservatism’s lasting symbol”, although in 
most modern eyes the symbol of conservatism at its most unpopular.2 
One of the crucial components of the political principle represented 
by Metternich is “conservative internationalism”. Viereck had no doubt 
that the world needed conservative internationalism in the twentieth centu-
ry even more than in the nineteenth century. In the foreword to the first, 
1949 edition of Conservatism Revisited he expressis verbis stated: in order 
to reassess the present western crisis, the historian must revisit the earlier 
crisis most resembling ours. This requires revisiting the “unacknowledged 
ancestor of our Western union, Metternich’s Concert of Europe…”3 In the 
following study the present author will try to outline Viereck’s interpreta-
tion of Metternichian conservatism, with a special emphasis on conserva-
tive internationalism. 
 
Conservatism as the opposite of political extremes 
 
Viereck was convinced that the “par excellence” conservative principle 
was “to be moderate in all things”, respecting “proportion and measure”, 
                                            
1 H. von SRBIK, Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch, Vols. I–II, München 1925, 
Vol. I, p. 1. 
2 P. VIERECK, Conservatism Revisited, New Brunswick, London 2005, (Originally 
published by Charles Scribers’s Sons in 1949), p. 69. 
3 P. VIERECK, Foreword to the 1949 Edition. VIERECK, p. 64. 
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rejecting all kinds of political extremes.4 This basic conviction provided 
the theoretical foundation for all of his major works, including Metapoli-
tics (1941), Conservatism Revisited (1949), Shame and Glory of the Intel-
lectuals (1953) and The Unadjusted Man (1956). The main objective of 
genuine conservatism, Viereck believed, is to arouse in Western man the 
sense of higher moral destiny. Laying emphasis on the idea of the nation 
was considered by him to be incompatible with moderation. In this respect 
Viereck held a markedly untypical view because the mainstream of con-
servative thinking has been traditionally committed to emphasizing the 
importance of national identity.5 One of the main reasons of why he val-
ued so highly the politics of Metternich is that he perceived in his efforts – 
realistically – the will to suppress national movements all of which threat-
ened directly the existence of the supranational Hapsburg Empire. This 
attitude in Viereck was in all probability closely bound up with the tragic 
experiences of the two world wars for which he held responsible – like a 
large number of other political thinkers – the national principle. He sum-
marized his position in the following passage: “In a Europe of overlap-
ping nationalities, a Europe of endless Alsace-Lorraines, Schleswig-
Holsteins, Sudetenlands, Polish Corridors, Transylvanias, Bessarabias, 
Macedonias, Trentinos and Triestes – in such a jigsaw-puzzle Europe na-
tionalism could in no case have asserted its claims except by unliberal 
blood-and-iron methods.”6 
The analysis offered by Viereck of the political views and prefer-
ences of Metternich is highly interesting for the historian of political ideas 
even if the reconstruction of historical reality by the noted conservative 
thinker can be criticized in a number of respects. Though there can be no 
denying the fact that Viereck conducted a deep research into the activity of 
Metternich, his approach is undoubtedly subjective. Consequently the in-
terpretation of Metternich as a principle of conservatism reveals more 
about Viereck’s own worldview than about the Austrian chancellor’s actu-
al achievement; however, for the purpose of this study, it is the viewpoint 
of the historian of ideas that is relevant. 
 
 
                                            
4 VIERECK, pp. 70, 75. (“The conservative is by definition moderate in all things”). For a 
general overview of Viereck’s conservatism see Ryn’s excellent introduction: C. G. RYN, 
Peter Viereck and Conservatism. VIERECK, pp. 3–45. 
5 For more details on the question of relation of conservative thought to the idea of the 
nation see: G. EGEDY, Konzervativizmus és nemzettudat (Conservatism and National 
Consciousness), in: G. EGEDY, Konzervativizmus az ezredfordulón (Conservatism at the 
Millennium), Budapest 2001, pp. 143–171. 
6 VIERECK, p. 86. 
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The interpretation of the historical context 
 
Any evaluation of Metternich cannot be separated from how we interpret 
his age, the historical background of his activity. The present author starts 
from the assumption that the key factor in this respect was the emergence 
of the national movements in Central Europe in the first half of the nine-
teenth century. The largest impact was generated by the Germans’ efforts 
at creating political unity, bringing to an end the age-old division of their 
states.7 The crucial point is how one relates to these movements. This pro-
cess of nation-building was considered by most observers – even by such 
analysts who were very critical towards the idea of the nation – as natural 
and legitimate. However, Viereck took an entirely different stand: he 
wrote about a “German revolt against Europe”. His words show quite 
clearly that in his eyes the German national renaissance constituted noth-
ing less than nationalism, even chauvinism. It becomes evident upon read-
ing his arguments that he makes no difference between two different con-
cepts, i.e. patriotism and nationalism. According to the present author this 
is an oversimplification but without taking it into consideration one cannot 
fully understand Viereck’s attitude towards internationalism. 
How did Viereck present the German national movement whose 
emergence was motivated to a large degree by the desire to counter the 
Napoleonic wars of French expansion? 
In his view the defining feature of this complex movement was the 
assumption of the existence of a mysteriously indivisible unit, the Volk. 
His thesis was expounded in details in his first book entitled “Metapoli-
tics”, based upon his doctoral dissertation and published in 1941. Its subti-
tle is revealing: “From the Romantics to Hitler”.8 The date of publication 
tells us that Viereck’s work was one of the earliest analyses of National 
Socialism – and it should be added that one of the most profound, surpas-
sing in quality a large number of later works.9 Viereck’s Metapolitics de-
rived the career of the idea of National Socialism not, as usual, from the 
consequences of the lost world war and of the great economic crisis of 
1929–1933 but directly from German romanticism. The American thinker, 
himself of German origin makes the following often-cited statement in this 
                                            
7 For more details on the German national movement see: I. GEISS, The Questions of 
German Unification, 1806–1996, London 1997, pp. 31–51. 
8 For the present study the following edition was used: P. VIERECK, Metapolitics. The 
Roots of the Nazi Mind, Capricorn Books 1965. (Originally published by A. Knopf in 
1941). 
9 In his later years Viereck himself criticized some statements of Metapolitcs but Ryn 
rightly stresses: “it reaches deep into the malady of modern western culture.” RYN, p. 
23. 
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book: “…through the centre of German hearts runs the great Roman wall. 
Speaking metaphorically, on one side of the wall are the classical, ration-
al, legalist and Christian traditions (often mutually conflicting) of the Ro-
manized German; on the other side (often mutually conflicting) are the 
paganism of the old Saxons, the barbaric tribal cults of war and blood and 
the anti-rationalism and anti-legalism of the romantics”.10 It is worth not-
ing that connecting Nazism with the German romantics was a new idea at 
that time and Viereck received heavy criticism for doing this; he was ac-
cused of anti-German war-mongering even by some anti-fascist Ameri-
cans.11 However, this was certainly not the case on his part. 
In Viereck’s interpretation the idea of the Volk – surpassing class 
boundaries – connects the romantic national movement of the nineteenth 
century with the National Socialism of the twentieth century. In proof of 
his statement he emphasizes: all the influential leaders of this movement 
believed passionately in the existence of the Volk. If we forget about it, 
says Viereck, we simply cannot understand German history after 1848. As 
for Metternich: if we wish to understand him, we have to know who in 
reality his enemies were. 
The wisdom of Metternich is proved in Viereck’s eyes by nothing 
else more convincingly than his definite rejection of the concept of Volk. 
The great conservative statesman considered it to be nonsense, and, in a 
similar vein, he was opposed to substituting the mysterious idea of “meta-
politics” for rational politics. Grillparzer, the well-known Austrian poet 
and writer later criticized heavily Metternich, alleging that his outlook had 
been narrowly fastened upon petty cabinet matters, “unaware that the time 
of national mass-politics had arrived”. Viereck acknowledges that Grill-
parzer was right: the time did arrive for the politics of the Volk. However, 
there was not much good in “Völkerpolitik”.12 It found its natural tool in 
“Realpolitik”, based on brute force – the very opposite of the concept of 
the “rule of law”, espoused by Metternich. The conclusion by Viereck can 
be summarized as follows: it was the merger of romantic nationalism, 
                                            
10 VIERECK, Metapolitics, p. 5. A number of commentators have pointed out that Vi-
ereck’s writings were in all probability influenced by his desire to dissociate himself from 
his father, a naturalized American who had openly sympathized with Germany during the 
World War II, and for his pro-German activity he had even been put in prison. 
11 A noted critic was the historian Jacques Barzun, professor of Columbia University. He 
accused Viereck of committing the error of „seeing the past only through the eyes of the 
present”. The 1965 edition of Metapolitics includes as appendix Barzun’s arcticle origi-
nally published in the Journal of the History of Ideas in 1941. See: VIERECK, Metapoli-
tics, pp. 347–351. 
12 VIERECK, Conservatism, pp. 89–90. 
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elaborating the idea of the Volk with materialist radicalism that led finally 
to the birth of German National Socialism. 
But is it not an extreme exaggeration to look for the roots of the 
twentieth-century totalitarianism in the first part of the nineteenth century? 
This question is posed by Viereck as well. “Is it being unhistorical to 
judge the anti-Metternichian nationalism and racism of nineteenth-century 
Germany by its Nazi consequences?”13 Though one may have doubts, the 
arguments in “Metapolitics” and “Conservatism Revisited” leave no 
doubt about the answer the American thinker: in his eyes this evaluation is 
perfectly valid. 
To prove his thesis Viereck devotes much energy to characterize 
the spiritual leaders of the German national movement of the first half of 
the nineteenth century; in fact, he deduces the character of the whole 
movement from their ideas. It is in this context that he lays special empha-
sis on presenting Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the nationalist educator, organiz-
er of student associations, (Bursenschaften), and propagandist of gymnas-
tics as the first “storm trooper”. Jahn preceded Gobineau in proclaiming 
the “biological purity” of the Volk and in propagating the idea of German 
racial superiority. In his view “Jahn – and later, Richard Wagner – are 
the two nineteenth-century Germans in whose writings the entire Nazi 
ideology appears point by point, long before any Treaty of Versailles”.14 
The public book-burnings in Wartburg in 1817 were also inspired and 
guided from afar by Jahn –and later praised by Goebbels. Viereck also 
emphasizes the role of Ernst Arndt: though he was “no ruffian demagogue 
like Jahn”, he was a very influential nationalist political philosopher who 
combined his anti-French feelings with a general xenophobia. Viereck 
quotes Goethe who feared that the romantic revival of the Siegfried leg-
ends might easily result in the glorification of ancient Teutonic barbarism. 
The famous poet, Heinrich Heine is also cited: though he himself was an 
ardent liberal and thus an enemy of Metternich, he feared more the emer-
gent new German nationalism than the conservative regime of Metternich. 
15 In his essay on German philosophy Heine anticipated that the German 
romantics would help bring about an anti-Christian religion, eulogizing 
nationalism and “the fanaticism of the Will”. 
Another spiritual enemy of Metternich’s politics was the romantic 
dramatist Heinrich von Kleist. He is also presented as the representative of 
that Pan-German nationalism whose influence on twentieth-century fas-
cism was – according to Viereck – direct and crucial. In his drama “Her-
                                            
13 Ibidem, p. 93. 
14 Ibidem, p. 96. 
15 Ibidem, p. 94. 
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mann’s Battle” (Die Hermannschlacht) written in 1808 about the struggle 
of the Germans and Romans, Kleist pictures the hero Hermann as a real 
Führer. He glorifies him for deceiving and then massacring the Roman 
legions of Augustus. The message of the play was that Germans must re-
sist French civilization just as they resisted the Roman attack in A.D. 9. In 
Metapolitics Viereck remarked: “Most of this influential play sounds as if 
written by a Nazi today…Hermann’s warriors appeal to the pagan god 
Wotan for victory. <Falseness> is deemed the eternal opposite of <blond 
hair and blue eyes>. The most ruthless militarism and Realpolitik are 
preached...”16 Hermann tricks the Roman Emperor “by a sort of Munich 
Pact”, and the playwright considers all means justified for Hermann. No 
wonder, adds the American thinker, that the Nazi editor of Kleist summa-
rized it as “revenge for suffered wrongs”, drawing an analogy with Hit-
ler’s revenge against Versailles. 
Searching for the roots of the twentieth-century tragedies Viereck 
came to the conclusion that prior to 1848 both the pro-Metternich con-
servatives and the anti-Metternich liberals were right in many respects; 
their greatest mistake was not to have become allies against the national-
ists – the forebears of National Socialism. “They should have joined their 
respective half-truths against the whole-lies of their real enemies, the self-
styled realists of anti-ethical Realpolitik…”17 The liberals committed the 
serious mistake of supposing – as Herder did – that nationalism might turn 
out liberal. According to Viereck it was this error that destroyed liberalism 
and democracy in Central Europe. The liberal internationalism of the mid-
dle classes and the conservative internationalism of the aristocrats spent all 
their energies in destroying each other and thereby created a “vacuum of 
loyalty” which came to be filled by militant nationalism as “tertius 
gaudens”. Referring to these historical experiences Viereck expressis ver-
bis acknowledged in the preface for the 1962 edition of Conservatism Re-
visited: in 1949, in the context of the Cold War his book tried to unite con-
servatives and liberals “against both fascism (heir of Metternich’s enemy: 
Realpolitik nationalism) and communism (heir of Metternich’s enemy: 
Jacobin terrorist radicalism)”.18 The mutual acceptance of the principle of 
moderation can – and must – create an alliance between conservatives and 
liberals if they are faced by political extremes of whatever shade. 
  
                                            
16 VIERECK, Metapolitics, p. 11. 
17 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 86. 
18 P. VIERECK, Author’s Note for the 1962 Edition. VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 59. 
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Metternich’s conservatism 
 
This interpretation of the historical context, this undoubtedly subjective 
interpretation of the German national movement provides the background 
for Viereck’s analysis of Metternich’s political views and attitudes. The 
American philosopher and historian considered Metternich to be the last 
great statesman of Europe because he had taken a stand for the political 
unity of the western world and had rejected definitely the idea of the na-
tion. (“Europe has become my native country” – Metternich said to Wel-
lington).19 In this approach the politics of the Austrian chancellor came to 
be identified with politics based on principles while the politics of his en-
emies are presented as based merely on mere force. (It is another question 
to what extent Viereck’s approach is justified by the facts of history but 
this dilemma is not primarily relevant in this study). Viereck even suggests 
that Metternich fought not only for the interests of Austria but for the sta-
bility of the whole continent, starting from the assumption that Austria’s 
interests overlapped with those of Europe. He reminds us that Metternich 
was almost predestined for a supranational way of thinking. He was born 
in the Rhineland, Koblenz, he was at home in all European capitals and set 
foot in Vienna only at the age of 22. The social class he came from, the 
aristocracy spoke the same language all over Europe and formed, using 
Viereck’s witty metaphor, an “international trade union”. Consequently 
his worldview “could not help being international”.20 
In connection with this personal background Metternich looked 
upon Europe – more than 150 years before the start of European integra-
tion! – as a single indivisible unit. To demonstrate the validity of this 
statement Viereck quotes the words of Metternich’s close friend and asso-
ciate, Friedrich Gentz, who “expressed the great truth that was also Met-
ternich’s basic assumption”: 
“Through their geographic position, through the uniformity of 
their customs, their laws, their needs, their way of life and their culture, 
all the states of this continent form a great political league, which with 
some justification has been dubbed the European Republic.”21 
Metternich’s hope to achieve the “rebirth of Europe”, together with 
his preference for moderation and his political wisdom clearly manifested 
itself at the Congress of Vienna where he came out in support of avoiding 
drastic sanctions against France. Prudently, he did not wish to incite the 
                                            
19 SRBIK, Vol. I., p. 320. 
20 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 90. 
21 Ibidem, p. 87. 
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French to a new war of revenge. As a result, France could keep – against 
the demands of Prussia – Alsace-Lorraine, of which she was stripped in 
1871 by the heirs of Metternich’s opponents. 
The conservative internationalism of Metternich played a crucial 
role also in the long struggle for German unification, in the rivalry be-
tween Prussia and the Hapsburg Empire. The contest between Berlin’s 
Stein and Vienna’s Metternich is presented by Viereck as not merely a 
personal rivalry but also as a conflict of impersonal principles. The Ameri-
can thinker emphasizes that the two statesmen fought for two entirely dif-
ferent objectives. Stein was committed to the German national idea and his 
only aim was to destroy the power of France, while Metternich was think-
ing in much broader terms: he wanted to rebuild the political unity of Eu-
rope, shaken by the French Revolution. Consequently, “they were fighting 
two different wars”: Stein’s was a “national war”, a war of peoples, while 
Metternich’s was “an international civil war”.22 For Metternich it was the 
“revolutionary spirit” that hid under the veil of national spirit. In other 
words: for Metternich both Jacobinism and nationalism were “anti-
conservative heresies”. In keeping with this evaluation Viereck approved 
Metternich’s tough measures against the revolutionary German students 
applauding Blücher, the victorious Prussian general at Waterloo because 
he perceived in them “national Jacobins” who had prepared the way for 
the National Socialism of the twentieth century. 
Viereck found it extremely important and therefore emphasized it 
in all his writings concerning Metternich that in contrast to the German 
nationalists the Austrian chancellor never persecuted the non-German na-
tions of the Hapsburg Empire. His attitude was in sharp contrast with the 
anti-Metternichian liberals who surrendered before German nationalism 
when their representatives in July 1848 supported by their votes the inter-
vention of the Prussian army in the Polish provinces. Their leader, Wil-
helm Jordan openly advocated the politics of “Drang nach Osten” and the 
Pan-German idea. In 1849 January Jordan even spoke about the Germans’ 
mission to Germanize other races.23 Viereck’s conclusion is unequivocal: 
“Such were the Good Democrats who liberated Europe from Metter-
nich.”24 The wisdom of Metternich’s politics was proved in Viereck’s 
eyes also by the failure of his short-sighted successor, Prince Schwarzen-
                                            
22 Ibidem, p. 92. 
23 In Metapolitics Viereck states that the German Revolution of 1848 is “falsely called a 
liberal revolution.” VIERECK, Metapolitics, p. 60. In Conservatism Revisited he also 
criticized the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, alleging that “the intolerant 
liberals and leftists of Kossuth” wanted the Croats speak only Hungarian in the new 
parliament. VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 99. 
24 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 101. 
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berg: his version of Realpolitik, based on the principle of “vive la force!” 
did much to pave the way for the success of Bismarck and Pan-German 
nationalism. 
In the 1960s a lively debate began among historians of the western 
world about the historical role of Metternich. In 1971 a book was edited 
with the title “The Metternich Controversy” containing the writings of the 
most respected experts, including Henry Kissinger’s. Viereck was also 
asked to contribute an article. The conservative American thinker gave the 
following expressive title to his article about Metternich: “Bastion Against 
Potential Fascism.”25 In this writing Viereck almost equals Heinrich Rit-
ter von Srbik, the well-known Viennese historian, the author of the two-
volume biography of Metternich in defending the Austrian chancellor. He 
argues that it is a huge mistake committed by a large number of historians 
to perceive in every anti-Metternichian actor a “liberal”. In many im-
portant cases his opponents were in fact not only nationalists but milita-
rists, racists or even proto-fascists, like for example the above-mentioned 
Slav-hating, war-glorifying Jordan. And when – adds Viereck – his oppo-
nents were genuine liberals, they tended to be abstract doctrinaires who 
tried to transplant such institutions in Central Europe that had there no 
historic roots.26 Metternich as a conservative disciple of Burke knew all 
too well that reforms and new institutions cannot be introduced “over-
night”. 
As a logical corollary to this chain of thoughts Viereck draws the 
conclusion: we must choose at last between an international and a provin-
cial perspective. The question to be posed is the following. Should we 
look upon our native country as “an ever broadening community of hu-
manity”, as Europe was for Metternich, or is it be a narrowly provincial 
nation? Viereck gives a definite answer: “On this choice the great build-
ers of Western culture, whether an Alexander the Great or an Erasmus or 
St. Paul long ago took their stand. And on this they stand closer to Profes-
sor Metternich than to all the Carbonari of Naples or to any Baron vom 
und zum Stein.”27 
 
Metternich and the conservative concept of freedom 
 
Any reference to Metternich would hardly remind a Czech or Hungarian 
reader of the idea of freedom since the chancellor’s name has been tradi-
                                            
25 P. VIERECK, Bulwark Against Potential Fascism. The Metternich Controversy, in: E. 
KREAHE (Ed.), New York 1971, pp. 89–93. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 90–91. 
27 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 103. 
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tionally associated with a repressive regime. However, Viereck is con-
vinced that the preferences and ideas of Metternich are much closer to the 
values of the British parliamentary system than is usually assumed by his-
torians. In his view Metternich was a devoted student of the “father of 
conservatism”, Edmund Burke, who had taught him to insist on organic 
development and self-restraint. Viereck speaks of a “basic link” between 
the English and the Metternichian ideas and assumes a “common evolu-
tion” from Burke.28 (It is worth remarking this it was Metternich’s close 
friend and associate, Friedrich Gentz who translated into German Burke’s 
famous work on the French Revolution). 
As mentioned above, insistence on political moderation was a mor-
al imperative for Viereck and this stance also involved a great respect for 
law. “The conservative lays the greatest possible stress on the necessity 
and sanctity of law’” – he writes in Conservatism Revisited, and goes on 
to formulate the often-cited words: “What prevents today’s baby from 
remaining a caveman is the conservative force of law and tradition…”29 It 
is hardly surprising in the light of this that Viereck calls one of the greatest 
merits of Metternich his commitment to the idea of the rule of law. The 
guiding principle, which Metternich claimed for his political values, is 
suggested by the motto in his coat of arms: Kraft im Recht, i.e. Strength in 
Law. For the historian of ideas it is of secondary importance whether Met-
ternich always kept to this principle in practice; the relevant aspect for this 
study is that Viereck attributes to Metternich the right conservative inter-
pretation of freedom. (This, in other words, also means that he expounds 
his own preferences and priorities referring to Metternich). 
What are the mains features of this concept of freedom? 
After his political fall in 1848 Metternich sought – and found – 
asylum in liberal England and many of his enemies saw in this fact the 
irony of fate. The arch-reactionary fleeing to the most liberal country of 
Europe… However, they were wrong, stresses Viereck because Britain’s 
success was not a disproof but a justification of the validity of Metter-
nich’s ideas. In his Mémoires the defeated chancellor wrote the following 
words about England: “The freest land on earth because the best disci-
plined.” In his unfinished Political Testament he offers the explanation, 
too: “Without the base of order liberty is only a disguise for the ambitions 
of some selfish group.”30 However, if Metternich’ evaluation of the British 
political system was so favourable, then arises the question: when he was 
                                            
28 Ibidem, p. 105. 
29 Ibidem, p. 72. 
30 Ibidem, p. 106. 
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in power, why did he not pursue such politics that were in keeping with 
the tenets of British conservatism? 
The answer is quite evident for Viereck. Metternich as a clever 
conservative recognized clearly that there was no universal model of the 
good constitution; the political establishment of a state must always con-
form to the local cultural and political traditions. And as for Central Eu-
rope, he was deeply convinced that it had not yet become ripe for more 
political freedom, whether governed by kings or liberals. The main reason 
for this was that Central Europe lacked the traditions of voluntary order. 
This insight explains the fact, argues Viereck, that although Metternich 
esteemed highly the British constitution, he consistently resisted the at-
tempts at introducing it artificially in the Hapsburg Empire in the first half 
of the nineteenth century. The drastic changes demanded by the liberals in 
the Empire would have led to such an anarchy that would have been much 
worse than keeping to the traditional ways of government. Self-imposed 
order is better than order imposed from above but even the latter is prefer-
able to anarchy. “Had these liberal doctrinaires of Naples and Cadiz un-
derstood Metternich’s philosophy of evolutionary growth, they might have 
rebelled less hastily and slandered his motives less” – remarked Vi-
ereck.31 Metternich had no doubt at all that a written constitution in itself 
was not more than “a sheet of paper”. By contrast the English constitution 
“is the work of centuries”, and not the work of a single decree. The differ-
ence between a real statesman and a fanatic ideologue lies in the fact, 
points out Viereck, that “the former knows the humble wisdom of the se-
cond best when the best is historically impossible.”32 
Most books on history present Metternich as an ardent enemy of 
any change and reform but this presentation is basically wrong according 
to the American thinker. To prove his view he mentions that by 1832 Met-
ternich had prepared large-scale plans for a new constitution and a parlia-
ment and their failure was not his fault but of his stubborn ruler, Emperor 
Francis who rejected outright any change in the government of his empire. 
Metternich tried to convince his Emperor by pointing out that his pro-
posals reconciled “the opposition between the monarchist principle and 
the democratic” – an argument, which gained the special approval of Vi-
ereck. He commented on it in the following way: “This is western spirit: 
this is conservatism at its best, the evolutionary middle way between des-
pots like Francis and the 1848 liberals.” He reminds his readers that 1832 
was the very year when the new Reform Bill was accepted in England, 
                                            
31 Ibidem, p. 107. 
32 Ibidem. 
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enlarging the franchise and draws the conclusion: “1832 is dramatic evi-
dence for our distinction between western and eastern conservatism.”33 
By contrasting Metternich with Emperor Francis Viereck on the 
one hand perceptibly endeavors to find excuses for Metternich – for ex-
ample he alleges that he bore no personal responsibility for the large-scale 
network of secret police.34 On the other hand, more importantly, by em-
phasizing this contrast he conveys the meaning of the difference between 
the conservative and the “reactionary” which is important because he re-
jected the latter just as resolutely as he rejected the radical-liberal position. 
(Therefore he hastens to add: this distinction is crucial in his days because 
too many Americans tend to think that communism can be opposed “by 
backing not conservatives but reactionaries like General Franco”).35 His 
summary is that Metternich was not in a position to use the extraordinary 
prestige he earned in foreign policy in domestic affairs. 
Of all this Viereck quotes the following words of Metternich: “… 
[Emperor Francis] followed my advice on foreign policy. He did not do so 
in internal affairs…Attributing a perhaps exaggerated importance to the 
secret societies…he thought he found the remedy against the evil in a mi-
nute surveillance of the would-be intellectual classes exercised by the po-
lice, who thereby became one of the chief instruments of his govern-
ment….in short, in a moral closing of the frontier. But it is useless to close 
the gates against ideas, they overleap them…The result was a dull irrita-
tion against the government among the educated classes. I told that to the 
emperor but on that point he was unshakable… If in 1817, even as late as 
1826 the emperor had accepted my ideas on the reorganization of the di-
ets, we would be perhaps in a position to face the tempest. Today it is too 
late” – he wrote on 1 March 1848.36 
For all his sympathy Viereck also criticizes Metternich in some re-
spects, especially for those of his measures that were directed against the 
freedom of thinking. The main targets are the ominous Carlsbad Decrees 
of 1819, which instituted censorship of the press and limited academic 
freedom. From a conservative point of view these are unacceptable – 
pointed out Viereck. (Carlsbad was Metternich at his “un-conservative 
worst”). However, he added in his article published in The Metternich 
Controversy that Metternich’s measures “were milksop compared with the 
racist, anti-semitic, war-plotting dictatorship favoured by such anti-
                                            
33 Ibidem, p. 108. 
34 “In general, the police harrowings known as the Metternich system should properly be 
called the Emperor Francis system.” VIERECK, Forword to the 1949 Edition, p. 65. 
35 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 110. 
36 Ibidem, pp. 108–109. 
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Metternichian agitators as Jahn.”37 The German universities were the 
strongholds of nationalist opposition to Metternich. (By way of excuse 
Mettternich himself referred to his desire to save Germany from “the dic-
tatorship of such men as Jahn and Arndt”). Metternich’s goal was, in Vi-
ereck’s interpretation, not to limit free thought but to prevent the enslave-
ment of free thought by irrational emotions. 
Viereck even suggests that if Metternich’s reform-proposals had 
been realized, the nations of the Hapbsburg Empire could have enjoyed a 
slow and organic evolutionary development similar to that of England. 
Thereby they could have avoided stagnation, leading to revolution.38 As a 
result of the upheavals in 1848 and the ensuing triumph of “ruthless dicta-
torship” practically all-constituent units of the empire received much 
harsher treatment from the central government in Vienna than before. 
Thus Viereck concludes that first the revolutionaries, and then the repre-
sentatives of Realpolik blocked Metternich’s conservative way to freedom. 
He was also convinced that since Metternich’s ideas had been defeated in 
1848, Central Europe alternated between unrepresentative extremes of 
right and left without establishing any deep-rooted centre. 
Viereck’s remarks on Metternich’s attitude to socio-political ques-
tions are also noteworthy. In his view Metternich preceded Marx in per-
ceiving that the liberty for which the new capitalist middle class was 
fighting was primarily a means by the help of which it hoped to wrestle 
away power from the aristocracy. In other words the slogan of liberty was 
a means for substituting its own economic oligarchy for the more respon-
sible traditional aristocracy. Metternich saw clearly that behind the clamor 
for representative institutions egoistic group-interests lay, and not at all the 
“common good of the people”. The rising middle class wanted to make 
representative institutions its own instruments. “The first instrument in the 
hands of the middle class is the modern representative system” – these are 
Metternich’s own words in a letter written in 1831.39 Thus Viereck argues 
that Metternich was well aware of the fact that the grab for power by the 
new capitalist class meant a direct threat to social harmony. He also cites 
another letter of Metternich, written to the then French premier Guizot in 
which we can read the following interesting statement: 
“The true character of our time is that of an era of transition….To 
me the political game did not at all seem to answer to the needs of the 
time: I made myself a conservative socialist. [socialiste conservateur] The 
conservative principles are applicable to the most diverse situations; their 
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38 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 112. 
39 Ibidem, p. 114. 
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worship is not enclosed within narrow bounds, they are enemies of anar-
chy, moral and material.”40 To Count Rechberg he wrote that it was no 
longer politics but the “social problem” that counted. In this – highly con-
troversial – interpretation Metternich is portrayed as a protector of the 
lower social classes. However, even Viereck could not give details of how 
Metternich tried to cope with the challenge of the “social problem”. On 
the other hand, this interpretation of the chancellor’s views was in close 
harmony with Viereck’s own aversion to free-market capitalism. He often 
praised the great conservative nineteenth-century English statesman, Ben-
jamin Disraeli for seeking restraints on the emerging liberal oligarchy and 
trying to reconcile the “two nations” of the rich and poor. Viereck sup-
ported the New Deal policy of Roosevelt for which he came to be very 
severely criticized by the mainstream of American conservative thought.41 
 
The Political Heritage of Metternich 
 
If we wish to summarize Viereck’ analysis of Metternich, we have to point 
out that the most crucial element among Metternich’s ideas was identified 
by Viereck as the moral imperative to avoid at all costs political extremes. 
As mentioned above, this stance coincided fully with the American think-
er’s own preferences, so he quoted with full approbation the words of the 
Austrian chancellor: “My constant efforts are directed against the ultras 
of all kinds.” He quotes from the Mémoires of Metternich the following 
statement as well: “The red and white doctrinaires shun me like the 
plague.” 42 About the extreme royalists of the French Restoration the Aus-
trian chancellor declared: “The Legitimists are legitimizing the Revolu-
tion.” Metternich was convinced that there was no greater danger for soci-
ety than any type of fanaticism. Significantly, Viereck adds: in his own 
century, as in Metternich’s day, “the only sane asylum… is an interna-
tionalism based on the middle way of balance and moderation.” This logi-
cally rules out an internationalism, which is based on extremes of left or 
right.43 In this way the principle of moderation is inseparably intertwined 
with the concept of conservative internationalism. Ryn is right in empha-
sizing that although the accuracy of Viereck’s interpretation of Metter-
nichian politics might be questioned, his development of the idea of con-
servatism “as a spirit of mediation between inherited traditional authority 
                                            
40 Ibidem, p. 115. 
41 R. MUCCIGROSSO, Basic History of American Conservatism (The Anvil Series), 
Malabar, Florida 2001, p. 88. 
42 VIERECK, Conservatism, p. 124. 
43 Ibidem. 
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and calls for reform”, in general terms mediation between extreme posi-
tions merits close attention.44 
In the second half of the twentieth century, in the age of the Cold 
War Viereck considered it to be the task of the heirs of the framers of the 
American constitution to defend the Western heritage. In the spirit of Met-
ternich he urged the United States to fight relentlessly “the national bol-
shevism” of Russia, “the Kremlin resurrection of Hitler” because he 
looked upon communism as an incarnation of fascism, as another variation 
of totalitarianism.45 He was sure that in its struggle against political ex-
tremes the Western world would benefit much from a reassessment of 
Metternich’s historical role.46 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This study is focussed on the political views of Clemens Metternich, the 
chancellor and foreign minister of the Hapsburg Empire. To be more pre-
cise, the article is concerned with Viereck’s interpretation of Metternich. 
Peter Viereck was one of the principle theoreticians of conservatism in 
twentieth-century America, who offered a markedly unorthodox analysis 
of Metternich’s conservatism, touching upon a number of crucial ques-
tions. He considers Metternich to be a “principle”, an exponent and guard-
ian of prudential conservatism and conservative internationalism. He em-
phasizes Metternich’s efforts to tame the resurgent nationalism of the Eu-
ropean nations and also his little-known attempts to reform the structure of 
the Hapsburg Empire. The approach adopted by this study is defined pri-
marily by an interest in the history of political ideas. 
 
Keywords 
Aristocratic Spirit, Concert of Europe, Conservative Internationalism, 
Conservative Way to Freedom, Fascist-Bolshevist Synthesis, “Kraft im 
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